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From Parameters, Spring 2001, pp. 29-43.
"There are experts of land, sea and air warfare. But as yet there are no experts of warfare. And warfare is a
single entity, having a common purpose." -- Giulio Douhet[1]

The wargames currently being played by the US armed services have come to resemble the most recent engagement
of those military forces in live combat in Kosovo: the good guys win convincingly and no one gets hurt. However,
before we laud the ability of the services first to simulate a warfighting victory and then to transform the virtual into
the real, we need to ask some questions. Are the nation's land, sea, and air wargames structured to produce Douhet's
"experts of warfare"? Are the services anticipating the changing nature of future conflict in their wargaming? Are the
experiences from those wargames enriching or challenging the services' vision? Are the lessons learned in the
wargames played by the separate services being transferred into the joint arena? In other words, when it comes to
wargames, who's winning and who's losing?
To address those questions, this article will examine the Title 10 games[2] currently being conducted at US war
colleges from the perspective of personal experience as players on the Blue (friendly) and Red (opposing) sides in
each of those wargames over the last few years, as well as that of neutral assessors. While applauding many of these
efforts, we are principally concerned that the services are winning their wargames but losing opportunities to shape the
armed forces for the future.
We need to acknowledge at the outset that wargames are necessarily wide in scope, narrow in application, and broad
in purpose. Wargaming, in one form or another, has been around for as long as the armed forces of one nation needed
to evaluate plausible offensive and defensive options against those of a potential adversary. As an analytical device, a
wargame can stretch across a wide spectrum of employment: investigating near-term geopolitical situations, testing
new operational concepts, developing new measures of merit, and determining capabilities and forces required to meet
credible future contingencies. Wargaming is a valuable tool, but it can be misused--particularly when attempts are
made to guide the future by championing defense programs caught up in contemporary budget battles. Moreover, no
single wargame can simultaneously and equally serve to train warfighters, to inform outsiders, to test concepts and
doctrine, and to evaluate future force levels. Just as combat requires clearly defined objectives, so does the gaming of
force application.
Playing Wargames
Congress authorizes the US armed forces to conduct Title 10 wargames to investigate the application of military force
as it might exist in the future. The US Navy conducts its games at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island
(Global), the Army at the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Army After Next/Transformation),
and the Air Force plays its Title 10 game at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama (Global Engagement). The
Navy's program has emerged from its well-respected Cold War Global series, and the Army and the Air Force games
are post-Cold War events, each now entering its fifth year.
The mechanics of the games, each typically involving hundreds of military and civilian professionals, are quite similar,
positing a future conflict between the armed forces of the United States (occasionally assisted by allies) and a capable,
although not necessarily symmetric, adversary. However, where once wargaming results were generated using look-up

tables and manual computation, now combat models and computerized databases bring new dimensions to the art of
wargaming. These computer programs can be used to evaluate the results of a massive air battle, the effectiveness of
defense against cruise or ballistic missiles, and even the probability of the interaction of two submarines quietly
searching for one another in several thousand square miles of ocean. To achieve the desired level of analysis,
specialized programs, computer models, and dedicated operators are often sent from interested government agencies to
support specific wargame calculations.[3]
The temptation to trust the "fast, accurate, but dumb" computer, unquestioned by "slow, sloppy, but brilliant" humans,
is one of the greatest hazards for wargamers. Because specialized computer models do not routinely factor in
simultaneously occurring game play, adjudication of their combined outputs requires a fine sense of evaluation and
aggregation by expert assessors conversant across a broad range of military skills. Describing most large wargames as
"model-aided" is therefore more accurate than terming them "computer-driven." And if major innovations are to occur
from wargames or, at least, insights reached as to how new operational concepts might be implemented, they will
emerge through the "wetware" developing the "wash-up" (i.e. the humans analyzing how the game unfolded), not from
the software driving the spreadsheet.[4]
Because the major wargames are sponsored by the separate military departments under Title 10 responsibility, they
have a decidedly single-service orientation to them.[5] Each service uses its own force structure--a projection of the
military force and capabilities it may possess in the future--often assuming that other services may not have advanced
as rapidly.[6] As a result, Title 10 games feature an understandable focus on service-specific doctrine or tactics, the
examination and (perhaps) justification of single-service concepts of operation, and (occasionally) support for a
program regarded as central to a service's roles and missions. It is also difficult for service participants, in the heat of
the virtual battle, to rise above game-playing to draw larger implications for strategy and long-range planning. A few
observations from recently played major service wargames illustrate some of these characteristics.

. Global. The series of Global games played from 1979 to 1990 had an immense impact on US Navy thinking. These
wargames, particularly those under the direction of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Tom Hayward, are generally
recognized as being the genesis of the "Maritime Strategy," the forward naval engagement of the former Soviet
Union.[7] However, Global has suffered some growing pains in transitioning from its highly respected Cold War
series, when a clear threat existed and scenarios were well defined, to the post-Cold War environment where planning
contingencies are much more uncertain. As we have noted elsewhere, wargaming seems to provide the most value
when the external environment remains relatively stable over the long term and the strategic competition can be
quantified with some accuracy.[8] It took the development of the doctrinal framework "From the Sea," and the
formation of concepts such as "network-centric warfare" before Global could begin contributing to the Navy's vision
of conflict in the post-Cold War world.[9]

. Army After Next/Transformation Wargame. In the first years of its existence, the Army After Next (AAN) series was
arguably the most ambitious and imaginative of all the service games. A supporting document for these games, "The
History of the Future," was a useful way of establishing the game's scenario. Set 20 years in the future to divorce it
from budget issues, AAN investigated the worth of significantly smaller units with vastly improved mobility and
firepower. The equivalent, perhaps, of employing supersonic aircraft in wargames of the 1930s, this visionary thrust
was well ahead of evolving Army doctrine, and understandably met opposition from the senior Army leadership. As a
result, the AAN wargame has been restructured to forecast a 10- to 15-year future and, in 2000, the name of the series
was changed to the Transformation wargame.[10]
A good thing, too, because the Army is now drawing sharp distinctions between those plans and programs that advance
transformation, and those that don't. In the Army's case, similar to the Navy experience, it took separate doctrinal
deliberations (and a flawed operational experience with Task Force Hawk in Kosovo) to realign the service vision
before it could be tested in wargames. This refocus of the Army's Title 10 game is added testimony to the difficult
nature of projecting service requirements based on a changing security environment and an ill-defined adversary.[11]
In fairness, it should be noted that the purpose of the Army After Next games was not to forecast the future, but "to
provide a basis for development and analysis of a long-term vision."[12] By repeating the games, the plan was to
conduct comparative analysis as scenarios and adversaries varied over the long term. In this case, however, it appears

that a confrontation with an unpleasant present, rather than the repetitive pull of a coherent vision of the future, was
the catalyst providing new direction for Army planning and wargaming.[13]

. Global Engagement/Aerospace Future Capabilities. The Air Force Global Engagement series and a companion
Future Capabilities game, directed by the Air Staff, have also suffered from the lack of a coherent view of the future.
Developing the concept of "Expeditionary Air Forces,"[14] therefore, was essential in giving the games purpose and
substance. This focus on a more traditional deployment of tactical forces was welcomed by the Air Force, which had
experimented with the military use of space, extended range operations, and unmanned vehicles in early versions of
the game. But these efforts probably had less effect on Air Force long-range planning than the game's designers hoped,
owing to the difficulty of redirecting planned investment streams. No matter how revolutionary a platform or system
might appear in wargames, if it doesn't fit current force structure, program initiatives, and budgetary ramps, it stands
little chance of survival in the real world--unless it is championed by top-level leaders. Thus, Air Force planners
emphasizing the capabilities of unmanned and space systems in their wargames acknowledged that these advancements
would not be made without significant increases in the budget.
This brief overview suggests that the armed services shouldn't rely on contemporary wargames to develop their longrange vision. Contributions of the Global series in developing the Maritime Strategy were unique in considering a
relatively short, five-year time span under a constant threat, thereby allowing the iterative development and testing of
doctrine and concepts. But the welcome fact that the United States does not now face a monolithic menace should not
prompt us to set aside the venerable practice of wargaming. Rather, with credible service visions, if not future
adversaries, now well established, we should be examining how wargames can enrich both service and joint strategies.
Winning Wargames
"Winning a wargame" must be carefully defined. The Blue team generally emerges as the ultimate victor in Title 10
games, although that may turn out to be a near-run thing.[15] Much like real wars of late, however, it isn't just the
military balance on the battlefield, but a subsequent geopolitical accounting that tallies the final score. Thus, the value
of a wargame resides not necessarily in watching the Red opponent lose, but in orchestrating an interaction providing
positive and unexpected insights relating to the stated game objectives--often after lengthy and meticulous
analysis.[16] On the other hand, if certain capabilities prove decisive in winning the wargame, some immediate postgame analysis is appropriate. Were the scenarios constructed self-serving? Did the models simulating conflict grant
certain systems significant advantages? If forces were severely stressed--even to the point of failure--did that event
provide fodder for new concepts and doctrine, or was it merely finessed as a game anomaly?[17]
A good indicator that wargames are really being won is when several separately conducted service games, even those
with different scenarios and varying time frames, arrive at a similar insight. The following three mutual conclusions
we have observed during recent major wargames clearly deserve greater exploration and experimentation in both
simulated and real environments.

. Leveraging Stealth. Army, Air Force, and Navy wargames have all projected the proliferation of theater ballistic and
cruise missiles, as well as advanced air defenses, imposing significant limits on the projection of US military power
into a region of interest. This has created an urgent requirement to provide survivable and precise weapon delivery
capability in rapidly deployable forces tasked with enabling the entry of follow-on units. Candidates for this role
include sea and air platforms whose stealth precludes interdiction and whose precise firepower permits access by
friendly forces with much deeper munitions pockets. In a high-threat or anti-access environment, game data support
the value of the early use of F-22 and B-2 stealth aircraft, as well as modified ballistic-missile submarines, against
enemy missile sites, air defenses, and communication nodes, thereby enabling the arrival and employment of nonstealthy platforms. Yet favorable assumptions often are made regarding the prompt and sustained flow of conventional
forces into the theater, and little analysis is dedicated to the effects on enemy capabilities and intentions of intense and
sustained firepower delivered early in the conflict from the sanctuary of stealth.

. Integrating Space. Another aggregated finding from recent wargames is how tempting it is for Red to attack US
space-based assets, such as global positioning system (GPS) satellites. From a gamer's perspective, the root issue is

how to quantify the loss of such space-based capabilities.[18] From a warfighter's viewpoint, the games suggest that
orbiting assets are likely to be critical in support of effective military operations. But players on both sides are much
less certain about how to play those assets. Wargaming has illustrated the friction between the military need to control
(and therefore deny enemy use of) space, and a political unwillingness to cross thresholds in space that could escalate
conflict on the earth. There is a tendency to regard space weapons and support capabilities as "silver bullets," left to
attack, or to attack from, as a last resort. But holding space as a sanctuary inhibits the examination of the
complementary or enabling use of these systems with air, sea, and land-based platforms.
An example is space-based radar systems, often played as a combination of Joint STARS air-to-ground and AWACS
air-to-air capability ("JWACS"), providing greatly expanded coverage and reduced risk to platforms and operators.
But these optimistic assumptions provide few opportunities to explore the space-based system's limitations--revisit
rates, down time as the satellites recharge their batteries, the inability to upgrade the technology on orbiting satellites,
the need for rapid re-launch and graceful degradation--or how they will complement and be phased-in with the current
generation of atmospheric systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Near-perfect, space-based JWACS
surveillance capabilities suggested by wargames can support service agendas for moving these capabilities to space.
But any idealized results must be tempered with an understanding of what technology can be expected when, how new
concepts of operation can smooth the transition from legacy to space-based systems, and which alternatives appear
most desirable, feasible, and acceptable.

. Connecting Networks. Global 98's central objective was to have its participants test various characteristics of
network-centric warfare, and all of the major service wargames seek to evaluate the implications of seamless system
connectivity and enhanced battlefield awareness for warfighting. Most game players believe that integrating the
"sensor-decider-shooter" connection is essential to the future conduct of warfare. But a distinction has been revealed
between those who believe we can design a top-down, network-centric architecture and then proceed to build it,[19]
and another school of thought, developed from a similar gaming experience, that doubts any such architecture could be
designed from a clean sheet of paper. What is needed, the latter school argues, is a step-by-step process of system
design, with users in the loop, ongoing iteration and experimentation, and a bottom-up approach.[20] To a degree, this
graduated path to networked warfighting mirrors the consensus regarding the military use of space just sketched. An
incrementalist view emerging from the service wargames argues for a network-centric concept--"battlespace internet"
is a recent buzzword--to be developed first by connecting atmospheric networks and systems. An example is a
combined single integrated operational picture merging data from AWACS, Joint STARS, U-2, Rivet Joint, Global
Hawk, and other platforms and sensors. Then space-based assets, such as a Discoverer II satellite constellation with
synthetic aperture radar/moving target indication (SAR/MTI) capability, could be systematically connected to that
proven network as they become reliable and affordable.
In contradiction to our thesis that game wins are reinforced by separate and mutual discovery, sometimes a singleservice show-stopper from an out-year game identifies certain technologies or desired weapon system characteristics
that should be made the subject of intensified research and development.[21] This was the case when it became evident
that there was no practical way to provide enough stored energy to operate the Army After Next's fighting vehicles for
the unrefueled length of time proposed. Prompted by this requirement, investigation has suggested that carbon
nanotubes can store thousands of times more hydrogen than any other means, and that an air/H2 fuel-cell-powered
electric vehicle could conceivably approach the required characteristics. An unexpected nugget such as this, if steered
into the appropriate acquisition channels, might be among the more valuable products from wargaming.
Losing Wargames
It is easier than one might think for the sponsoring activity to lose a wargame. All it takes is to fail in setting clear
game objectives (or setting too many), to allow game controllers and assessors to push a desired outcome (as some
even unconsciously tend to do), or to trivialize or ignore the results of the game. Further losses accrue from failing to
analyze the findings of Title 10 games for hidden insights and issues by as many entities as appropriate. Global and
Global Engagement results probably should be assessed at Carlisle Barracks, just as the Air Force and Naval war
colleges should be reviewing their sister services' Title 10 games. That is, the findings from each service's wargames
need to be subjected to cross-examination--particularly when and where they conflict. Just as serendipitous mutual
discoveries suggest a wargame win, a dichotomy in the way simulated wars are conceived and conducted may indicate

where a real future battle may be lost. Some examples of losing wargames follow:

. Anti-anti-access. One of the more contentious issues found in future wargame scenarios is access to the theater.[22]
The anti-access challenge to forward force deployment can range from geographical and political constraints to the
increasing military-technical capabilities of potential adversaries, including the use of weapons of mass destruction or
disruption. Although numerous studies on which wargame scenarios are based suggest that regional adversaries could
develop a robust anti-access force by 2010,[23] the major service wargames fail to deal with this issue uniformly. For
example, while the US Navy and Marine Corps eagerly engage in wargames where land access is limited and power
must be projected from the sea, the Air Force and Army are far less interested in these scenarios. When Air Force
wargamers face the need to conduct extended-range operations in wargames, they struggle over accomplishing
traditional tasks, such as suppressing enemy defenses and gaining air superiority, from a great distance. But few
players in blue suits argue that the USAF should adjust its investment strategy to better balance the number of longrange attack aircraft currently planned in relation to the acquisition of short-range fighters.[24] Therefore, the general
post-game reaction has been to support the position, "If we don't have access, we won't go."
. Garbage in, Gospel out. The flip side of the positive network-centric issues previously suggested is that the display
of game data needs to include a confidence level assigned to its accuracy. We alluded earlier to the argument that the
greater complexity and computing power now found in warfighting models bring a loss of transparency.[25] Worse
than that, these advances can create false confidence in the technology and tactics being submitted to a testing
environment. Two examples illustrate the dangers. In a recent Future Capabilities wargame, the support modelers fell
hopelessly behind the pace of the day's events owing to unforeseen strategic choices on the part of Blue and Red, as
well as untimely computer crashes. The lead assessor in one of the parallel games had no choice but to revert to the
"MSU" model--that is, "make stuff up." In this case the assessors referred to pre-game computer runs to bound the
problem and to develop a reasonable, if somewhat favorable, estimate of Blue losses from a massive cruise missile
attack on forward bases. But at least they were able to explain the rationale behind their damage estimates at the next
morning's in-brief.
A similar situation during a recent Global Engagement game designed to test--even to stress--an Air Force
expeditionary concept could have more serious repercussions. In this wargame, the effectiveness of a small fighter
force deployed into primitive forward bases depended on both the high kill probabilities of advanced anti-armor
munitions as well as the "just-in-time" air delivery of these weapons at forward locations. To halt advancing enemy
ground forces short of their objectives, the weapons had to prove effective and the munitions had to be there when
needed. The rub was that extensive RAND research earlier in the year had suggested that against a smart and adaptive
adversary in difficult terrain, advanced anti-armor munitions might achieve only a fraction of the advertised kill
probability.[26] Nonetheless, throughout the game, assessors estimated results based on pre-game model runs that
assumed higher kill probabilities. These back-of-the-envelope assessments misled senior Blue participants regarding
the effectiveness of the force in halting the enemy advance and failed to evaluate the logistical aspect of the
deployment--ensuring enough munitions were present to support less-than-nominal kill rates. This hidden optimism
contributed to the finding that the expeditionary concept proved workable when, in two key areas, it was not stressed at
all.

. The Thundering Present. To a significant degree, the "fog of peace"[27] is as murky as Clausewitz's "fog of war."
Both are encountered in trying to use a wargame to peer into the future while the players are also being pushed by the
priorities of the present. One example of the present intruding upon the future occurred at the beginning of the Global
98 wargame, conducted to explore the themes of "network-centric warfare and naval fires." Each Title 10 wargame, in
addition to major and minor players, the assessors, and the game controlling authority, also has various supporting
cells to provide expertise and insight in key areas. The Science and Technology Cell's primary function at the Global
98 game was to provide future projections of technology that could be available to the game players, and to suggest
applications resulting from ongoing R&D. Unfortunately, the members of the cell charged with anticipating naval fires
capability in 2010 were brought up short by this cryptic note in their game booklet describing future force capabilities:
"Arsenal ship was discontinued as an active project and is correspondingly deleted from this list." Thus a real-world
procurement decision unnecessarily constrained the game players' projections regarding the capability of a

noncombatant ship maximizing firepower and minimizing manning.
Current doctrine, as well as current acquisition plans, can also contribute to the wargame loss column. In another
recent Global game, the Blue naval commander, for fear of mines and diesel-electric submarines, chose not to enter a
relatively shallow body of water on one side of the peninsula where the conflict was under way, although the shallower
side was clearly where naval power could be best employed in defense of the peninsula. As usual, Blue eventually
won, but the players lost an opportunity to test survivability in the shallow waters (there were no mines or submarines
there, after all). Other losers in this game were those struggling to evaluate and update Navy doctrine for operations in
shallow littorals. By many measures, those generating doctrine benefit most from games in which operational actions
fail, rather than when they succeed. The simple reinforcement, rather than the challenging, of current operational
concepts in out-year games is wasteful at best and dangerous at worst.
The Wargames After Next
Wargames, like service doctrine, technology, and operational concepts, are undergoing an evolution that may result in
future wars being fought in very different ways. If wargaming is to contribute to this process, what are some of the
positive directions that future Title 10 games might take?

. Focus on Joint Operations. Games at the three war colleges naturally tend to be service-centric. That is not
inappropriate, if key service issues are to be properly tested and investigated. The Army needs to explore transforming
from a heavy to a light force, the Navy has to probe the difficulties of operations in the littoral, and the Air Force must
investigate impediments to implementing their expeditionary force concept. Future major US military operations are
likely to be increasingly joint, however, and each of these gaming efforts must have credible sidebar play by the other
services--logically synthesized from their respective wargaming efforts and overseen by experienced people of
appropriate seniority. In addition, each wargame needs external support from other agencies if matters such as space
operations and global connectivity are to be believably injected. The degree to which credible modeling of space
support has been brought to the Title 10 games is a tribute to a small cadre of individuals who have lugged computers,
software, and themselves from one site to another while steadily refining methods and techniques.[28]
While these experts are necessary to gain insight into arcane but crosscutting issues, each service also would benefit
from a broad review of its Title 10 and other wargames by its sister services, as well as from joint and interagency
analysis. Experienced players from other organizations who are not only less biased toward the approved solution, but
also are cognizant of the wishful thinking that tends to promote service roles, missions, and budgets, might provide
some of the best insights. Outside agency assessment is a useful way to verify that conclusions drawn from
assumptions are not mistaken as facts.
We probably don't need to worry about aircraft carriers being routinely sunk in Army or Air Force games. They are
rarely lost at Global where, however, low observability isn't played with fidelity and B-2s are downed. Change, if it is
to occur, has to be an institutional epiphany--the Air Force will not accept unquestioned conclusions from Global that
long-range stealthy bombers prove more effective than fighters in anti-access scenarios, nor will the Navy necessarily
buy into an Army wargame finding that submarines armed with cruise missiles contribute more to the littoral mission
than do destroyers armed with cruise missiles. However, if each war college were tasked with the same scenario,
played the wargame from a service-centric perspective, and then watched as their decisions were reviewed and
evaluated in another service or joint forum, the benefits of these games would undoubtedly multiply.

. Stretch the force to failure. Wargaming can profit by applying concepts of both destructive and nondestructive
testing. In industry, if a test objective is to prove that a current product meets customer expectations, then some form
of nondestructive testing is appropriate. Tested to these expectations, the product is not supposed to fail. However, if a
complex product is to be improved, then the manufacturer often resorts to destructive testing--e.g., driving an
automobile without changing the oil for as many thousands of miles as it takes for the engine to seize. The test failure
is then analyzed, and some components might be reengineered. During much of the Cold War, Global could be viewed
as a type of nondestructive testing, serving to validate existing and emergent doctrine for the next five years. Testing
the force to failure, however, accelerated the development of the Maritime Strategy. Title 10 games now being played

should similarly include destructive testing, stressing concepts to failure to improve the doctrinal product. Learning
through losing wargames can emulate the historical example of nations transforming their military after suffering a
major defeat. US armed forces are likely to emerge as winners of those wargames in which Blue players manage to
lose in the most elegant and imaginative fashion against a crafty and innovative Red.
A good example of using a wargame to stretch a force to failure already exists in the table-top Dynamic Commitment
wargames initiated in 1996 to support the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the congressionally-mandated
examination of US military strategy and forces. The building blocks for these wargames were a pool of about 50
vignettes, based on historical operations and current contingency plans, calling for the use of military force. Dynamic
Commitment became focused on what are now termed "Low-Density, High Demand" (LD/HD) assets.[29] Insights
from this game noted the fragility of certain specialized units, such as the Air Force AWACS and Joint STARS
aircraft and the Navy's EA-6B, when they were tasked with sequential requirements. In the wake of these wargames,
the QDR acknowledged that these and other systems were likely to be used at very high operating tempos, but argued
that LD/HD assets were being effectively allocated across competing priorities and, specifically, that EA-6B
deployments had been stabilized.[30]
There's nothing like a real war to test a wargame--or a policy. Operation Allied Force led to a number of conclusions
supporting Dynamic Commitment and contradicting the QDR. During the air war over Kosovo, the EA-6B, Joint
STARS, and other LD/HD assets were stretched to their limits, bringing into question DOD's ability to forecast and
effectively manage such valuable, limited forces, and pointing to the need for increased surveillance, command and
control, and electronic combat platforms.[31] Although Dynamic Commitment is being played again as a precursor to
the 2001 QDR, the previous experience suggests that lessons learned from failed forces, or lost wargames, are difficult
to insert in the policy process.[32]

. Strengthen the link between gaming and experimentation. In noting the slow pace of the transformation process,
DOD's most prominent consumer of wargaming, Net Assessment's Andy Marshall, has argued that it is time to move
from games to real experimentation. We agree. But the pace and scope of what is passing for experimentation at the
newly established Joint Forces Command is modest, at best. As Senator Joe Lieberman pointed out in a speech at the
end of 1999 on transforming national defense, "Joint Forces Command has not yet conducted its first major
experiment, and it has not yet made its first recommendation that threatens a core service weapon or role."[33]
There are both budgetary and bureaucratic reasons why this is so. Funding for joint field experimentation is
inadequate; Congress cut the requested Joint Forces Command experimentation budget from $500 million to $30
million, while approving a combined $550 million a year for the services' individual experimentation programs.
Therefore, the command's J-9 experimentation office can do little in comparison with single-service efforts. And
although one goal of joint experimentation, as Senator Lieberman implies, is to identify redundancies among the
service's individual efforts, it is clear that service interests, under the current division of dollars and influence, will
continue to hold sway.[34]
Wargames could help in setting a joint experimentation agenda by removing redundancies from a simulated battle and
quantifying the results. With J-9 having identified 50 agencies and products within the Defense Department working in
areas related to finding and attacking mobile targets, using modeling and simulation to begin analyzing the
comparative worth of some of these programs seems a reasonable way to advance experimentation. For example, a
wargame leading to an experiment could be designed to demonstrate the value of adding space-based SAR/MTI to an
existing array of ground-based systems that have greater tactical mobility but comparatively limited range and
survivability.
One of the more promising ways in which this gaming-experimentation process has begun at Joint Forces Command is
in support of a new operational concept termed "rapid decisive operations" aimed at winning small-scale contingencies
by applying joint firepower. The concept's purpose is to explore the rapid deployment of joint forces to enhance
conventional deterrence and speed conflict resolution through a series of wargames that might then lead to
experimentation.[35] Although these games and experiments are focused on a lesser contingency rather than a major
theater war, the concept of designing, wargaming, and experimenting with small, agile forces appears to fit service as
well as joint doctrine. Thus, the concept of a joint task force or "vanguard" force, as some have proposed, composed of

traditional units of carrier battle groups, armored divisions, and tactical fighter wings, is likely to incorporate all the
inherent problems of current service wargames and prove far too unwieldy and expensive to conduct serious
experimentation.[36] A more productive approach would be first to game, then to simulate and experiment with a force
composed of an attack submarine supported by unmanned ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets, a
rapidly-deployable light brigade, and a minimum forward deployment of stealthy air superiority assets backed by USbased long-range strike. That might also provide insight into the future of joint operations, including the ability to
project power over great distances with much-diminished logistics requirements.[37]
The quotation introducing this article by Giulio Douhet, an early air power theorist, suggests that we need experts in
joint warfare. We believe those experts can be developed and nurtured through the time-tested practice of wargaming-particularly if they learn, along the way, that you can't win 'em all. Losing the next game could help in winning the
next war.
NOTES
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